Introduction
Nowadays, most of nuclear power plants (NPPs) operating in the world or under construction are large-scale reactors with an electrical output around 1,000 MWe. This offer corresponds to the needs of large power grids like those in Europe, USA, Japan or China where electrical connections are powerful and utilities can afford a huge initial investment. However, these units are too powerful to fit in smaller grids where they would represent more than 10% of the installed capacity.
Thus, current nuclear offer does not address the needs of developing countries or archipelagos, where the grids are smaller and the investment capacities reduced. This is why many nuclear designers are developing new concepts of NPPs: Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). Electrical output of these future plants will be below 300 MWe. The financing would be eased by a more progressive capital expenditure, a shorter construction time and an accelerated return on investment [1] . The large reactors "economies of scale" are replaced by small units "economies of number" (series effect, learning effect, shared support facilities).
But the small modular reactors costs are still penalized by important civil engineering work since reactor system is sealed into large underground concrete structures. Furthermore, ICoNETS Conference Proceedings there is significant energy demand in areas where land is scarce, highly populated or unsuitable for the construction of NPPs -because of the threat of natural hazards for example. Based on these two ascertainments, DCNS has imagined a solution to address the energy needs of such countries, without requiring a suitable construction land and without high civil engineering cost. This solution is FLEXBLUE ® , a subsea-based Small Modular Reactor. DCNS is a French state-owned company, which has been designing, building, maintaining and dismantling ships of the French Navy and many foreign Navies for several centuries. DCNS engineering offices and shipyards have especially designed and built nuclear submarines and nuclear aircraft carriers during the last 50 years. Not less than 17 nuclear-propelled ships have been delivered by DCNS teams.
The goal of this study is to work out an innovative strategy to handle a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) with passive systems only, without releasing any radioactive elements to the environment, and without flooding the containment. A SGTR is a major accident for Pressurized Water Reactors. Indeed, when a PWR is at power, the steam generator (SG) tubes form both the second and the third confinement barriers because the main steam lines at SG outlets bypass the containment. When a rupture occurs, possibly contaminated primary fluid flows out the containment to the secondary system.
The Flexblue

®
Concept Location and Lifecycle
FLEXBLUE
® is a subsea and fully transportable nuclear module. Its power output is 160 MWe and is sent to the grid by submarine cables. The module is anchored on the seabed, a few kilometers away from the shore, at an immersion depth comprised between 50 and 100 meters. The module is a 150-meter long, 14-meter diameter horizontal cylinder. Several modules can be gathered into a FLEXBLUE ® farm. The module is remotely operated from an onshore control center. There is not permanent staff on board, only occasional presence for light maintenance. A FLEXBLUE ® module is not a submarine: it is not self-propelled; it does not use any military devices but only civilian technologies. It is designed for the single purpose of delivering electricity to the grid.
Once set up on the seabed, the reactor starts a 40-month production cycle. Then, production stops for refueling. The module is removed and transported by a ship to a coastal support facility where the spent fuel pool is located. Then the module is sent back on production site and a new cycle begins. Major maintenance and control occur every ten years (every three fuel cycles). FLEXBLUE ® 's lifecycle is presented in Fig. 1 and its module main characteristics are shown in Table 1 .
Construction
FLEXBLUE ® will be completely manufactured in factories and then assembled in a shipyard, using naval modular construction techniques that DCNS perfectly masters. Components can be made in different places in parallel, which reduces the construction time. Then, they are mounted on modular structures named 'skids'. The skids are finally inserted into the hull.
Compared to a large outdoor construction site, this industrial process enables a very modular assembly, a reduced construction time and a better quality of the work (which eases the compliance demonstration). Thus, the industrial risk is reduced. The construction cost of a SMR is supposed to be higher than the one of a large NPP, because of the economies of scale [2] . However, economies of scale are not the only ways to decrease the capital cost per MWe. There are many SMR specific factors that make the capital cost of a SMR close to the one of a large reactor:
1.
Co-siting: when several units are built on the same site (like a FLEXBLUE ® farm), capital cost is reduced because a lot of work is shared (geological studies, site licensing process, public acceptance, grid connection).
2.
Modular design: as explained in the previous section, a modular design and a modular construction contributes to reduce the cost of a nuclear unit.
3.
Series effect: because of their small output, the scheduled number of SMRs is high.
Thanks to this serial production, there will be a "learning effect": the Nth-of-a-kind will be less expensive as N is growing.
4.
Shared facilities: SMRs will make possible an increased mutualisation of support functions which is cost efficient. In the FLEXBLUE® concept, the control centre operates an entire farm. The support facility (refuelling, waste management, maintenance) is shared between several modules and even several farms.
5.
No civil engineering: this factor is FLEXBLUE® specific. The module does not require any expensive and time-consuming large concrete building like typical NPPs and other SMRs.
By considering the beneficial of those factors, SMRs can be competitive againts the usual large NPPs, and generally in the energy market [2] . 
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ICoNETS Conference Proceedings DCNS analysis leads to the same conclusion, and shows that the levelized cost of energy produced by a FLEXBLUE ® module will be between 100 and 120 €/MWh. This cost is slightly higher than electricity cost from new NPPs but still very competitive in the energy market.
Besides, the investment required is much more progressive and make the nuclear energy accessible for utilities which have not the capacity to finance the upfront cost of a large NPP [3] . The market that FLEXBLUE ® addresses is very large. An important share of human activity and population is located near seawater, so electricity demand is high on the coastlines. FLEXBLUE ® is the only nuclear solution to deliver electricity at a short distance of a coastal highly populated area without compromising safety. In addition, immersion is a great protection against many natural hazards like tsunamis or earthquakes (the module will be attached on the seabed by anti-seismic studs). FLEXBLUE ® also answers to the needs of countries eager to create local qualified jobs and to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels (to be more independent energetically or to reduce their greenhouse gases emissions, or both). For a new-comer country in nuclear energy, FLEXBLUE ® offers the possibility of investing at one's own speed. This flexibility is a key asset in today's uncertain energy market.
Impact
The and liquid effluents will be collected and treated every three years by the support facility. Another great asset of FLEXBLUE ® is its removability. The installation of modules is fully reversible because there is no large concrete structure. Thus, no dismantling is needed onsite at the end of the plant lifetime. The intact site will be quickly restored to the environment.
This full removability also authorizes modules to change production site along their 60-year lifetime. Dismantling of the module will take place in an appropriated shipyard, like it has already been done for several retired nuclear submarines.
Thanks to these unique features, unmatched in the nuclear field, FLEXBLUE ® is respectful of the environment and more easily acceptable for the population. It makes the nuclear energy more accessible to countries eager to develop their electrical production with clean, safe, reliable and low-carbon solutions.
Reactor FLEXBLUE ® uses the most reliable and proven nuclear technology both for electricity production and naval environment: a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). More than 60% of currently operated NPPs in the world are PWRs, and more than 90% of nuclear submarines host a PWR. 
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ICoNETS Conference Proceedings two-loop reactor, with a pressure vessel, two horizontal recirculating steam generators (SGs), two canned coolant pumps and a pressurizer as shown in Fig. 4 . Primary loops are designed to ease natural circulation. Meanwhile, FLEXBLUE ® reactor characteristics are given in Table 2 [4]. The primary system and all the auxiliary and safety systems that carry primary fluid are located inside the reactor compartment of the module as shown in Fig. 3 . This compartment forms the third barrier of confinement (the first one is the fuel cladding and the second one is the primary system pressure boundary). The other compartments host the turbo-generator, an on board control room, instrumentation and control panels, process auxiliaries and a living area for occasional workers. 
Safety Concept and Safety Systems
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ICoNETS Conference Proceedings are designed in order to operate passively according to the IAEA passivity definition [5] . All safety functions are fulfilled without any operator action and external electrical input. The little amount of energy needed at the beginning of a transient for actuation and monitoring is supplied by on board, redundant emergency batteries.
In addition, the onshore control center hosts emergency generators that can supply active systems in the module through submarine cables in case of abnormal transients, but none of those are safety-related. Nuclear safety is fully guaranteed by the passive devices located into the module.
This safety concept is inspired by the lessons learned from previous nuclear accidents in the world, especially the Fukushima Daiichi accident. In the FLEXBLUE ® concept, safety does not depend neither on emergency diesel generators (that have been flooded by the tsunami in Fukushima) nor on human intervention (that can lead to mistaken actions). Safety only relies on some automatic operations, and mainly on permanent natural phenomena: gravity and natural circulation of water between a heat source (the core) and a heat sink (the ocean). This makes the FLEXBLUE ® safety concept very robust.
Reactivity control
If an emergency signal is actuated by an abnormal situation in the reactor, chain reaction can be stopped passively by two diversified devices. The first one is the control rods that drop in the core by gravity. The second one is the gravity-driven emergency boron injection system, which is actuated only in case of anticipated transient without scram. Both these devices can independently shutdown the reactor and keep it subcritical up to cold shutdown state [4] .
Core cooling
The core residual heat after scram is removed by four cooling loops, each one able to transfer 50% of decay heat:
i. Two primary chains are connected to the primary circuit: each one includes an inlet pipe connected to a hot leg, a passive primary heat exchanger (PPHX) immersed in a large safety water tank, and an outlet pipe connected to a cold leg. The intermediate heat sink
formed by the safety tank is cooled by the ocean through the metallic hull.
ii. Two secondary chains are connected to the secondary circuit: each one includes an inlet pipe connected to a main steam line, an emergency condenser (EC) directly immersed in seawater and an outlet pipe connected to a feedwater line.
Thanks to the infinite heat sink -seawater -and to the elevation difference of the heat sink with respect to the heat sources, the four chains operate passively by natural circulation. Thanks to the unlimited heat sink (the ocean), grace period is theoretically infinite for both targeted safe states, which is a breakthrough in nuclear safety. 
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Radioactivity confinement
Confinement of the radioactive isotopes is guaranteed by three hermetic barriers: the fuel cladding, the primary circuit pressure boundary and the containment boundary. The latter one is formed by the hull and the reactor compartment walls and is designed to sustain a 10-bar internal pressure. To protect its sealing against over pressurization, it is equipped with a Pressure Suppression System as shown in Fig. 7 . Indeed, in case of a break in the primary or secondary systems, the pressure in the reactor compartment quickly rises. The pressurized airvapor mixture in the drywell is passively driven to the bottom of the wetwell where the vapor is condensed. It significantly reduces the pressure in the drywell. 
Complements
The large safety tank in the reactor compartment plays three important roles: intermediate heat sink for the passive primary heat exchangers; low-pressure injection source in case of a loss of coolant accident; suppression pool to protect the containment sealing. They also act as an efficient radiation shield to protect workers and systems located in the adjacent compartment.
The capability of the hull to reject decay heat to seawater is a key point of the safety concept. It is needed to cool the safety tank and to condense vapor in the containment.
FLEXBLUE
® hull heat transfers have been investigated [6] . Results show the great potential of the design to remove residual power to the heat sink as shown in Fig. 8 .
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Severe accidents
The availability and the infinity of the ocean around the hull make the likelihoods of core damages extremely low. Still, the reactor coolant system and the containment are designed to sustain a core melting. The mitigation strategy consists in in-vessel retention of the corium. It is possible thanks to an external cooling of the vessel by water provided by the safety tank. In a review of in-vessel retention state-of-the-art [7] , the French Institute for Nuclear Safety asserts that this strategy is feasible for SMRs with appropriated cooling circuit around the vessel. 
Goal of the Study
Context
Steam Generator Tube Rupture
A SGTR is a major accident for Pressurized Water Reactors. Indeed, when a PWR is at power, the SG tubes form both the second and the third confinement barriers because the main steam lines at SG outlets bypass the containment. When a rupture occurs, possibly contaminated primary fluid flows out the containment to the secondary system.
On current land-based PWRs, atmospheric steam discharge valves are used to cool down the secondary system, which is contaminated by primary water after the rupture. The affected SG is then isolated by the operator, so the radioactive leak is stopped. But one can see that radioactive elements are rejected to the environment, and their amount is highly dependent on the celerity of the operator in the control room. Regarding the safety objectives of FLEXBLUE®, this accident management is not satisfactory.
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The easiest strategy to manage a SGTR in the FLEXBLUE® reactor is to consider the tube rupture as a small break LOCA as shown in Fig. 9 . The accident analysis of this transient is presented in [8] . This strategy is acceptable: all the safety criteria are respected. However, the consequences on the availability of the plant are important. The reactor compartment is flooded with primary water and it would take time to restore the operability of the plant. 
Analysis Tool and Reactor Model
Modelisation
FLEXBLUE® reactor is modelled with ATHLET in accordance with GRS guidelines [9, 10] . The nodalization of the circuits is performed in order to get both a sufficient accuracy and an acceptable calculation time. Two core channels are modelled: an outer ring and an inner channel where power density is higher. In this latter one, the hot fuel pin is modelled to 
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The model considers a 2.5-second delay between the scram signal and the full insertion of control rods. Decay heat calculation is based on formulas from [11] , which are extracted from standards of American Nuclear Society [12] , and then conservatively increased by 20% to respect NRC guidelines [13] . Fig. 11 presents the considered decay heat for the accident analyses. 
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Elaboration of a New SGTR Strategy
As stated previously, the FLEXBLUE® strategy in case of a SGTR must avoid the flooding of the containment and lead to a safe shutdown state where primary system is closed (Fig. 6 ). The flooding of the containment is caused by the depressurisation of the primary system and the injection of the low-pressure safety tank. These two events happen only when the low-level signal is actuated in the core makeup tanks (the first tanks that inject water in the vessel after a LOCA). To avoid the flooding, it is mandatory not to trigger this signal (see red cross on the process in Fig. 11 ) and then to keep the CMTs filled with water -at least partially. This is possible if the amount of coolant lost through the SG tube rupture is reduced. The driving force of this leak is the difference between the primary pressure and the pressure in the affected steam generator (respectively 155 bars and 62 bars at nominal conditions). The most efficient way to reduce the loss of coolant through the leak is to eliminate as quickly as possible this difference of pressure. Two parallel actions must be implemented in the SGTR mitigation strategy:
1. Decrease the primary pressure. The opening of the depressurisation valves is not an option because the containment must not be flooded. So, the passive primary heat exchangers and the passive secondary emergency condensers will be used to remove decay heat from the primary system and decrease its pressure.
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ICoNETS Conference Proceedings 2. Increase the pressure in the affected SG. Usually, SG pressure is reduced by the corresponding emergency condenser (EC). If the condenser is closed, the SG pressure will increase. However, this action is limited by the SG safety valves: they will open and discharge steam in the safety tank if the pressure exceeds 83 bars.
Another concern is the detection of the accident. Unlike a large break LOCA, a SGTR is a small leak and is not easy to detect. Three signals must be closely monitored: a. Abnormality in the operation of the primary volume control system. This signal indicates that something is wrong in the balance of primary fluid inventory.
b. Abnormality in the regulation of SG water level. This signal indicates that something is wrong in the balance of secondary fluid inventory.
c. Detection of Nitrogen-16 in the secondary system. This isotope with a 7-second halflife is an activation product of primary water. It is not supposed to be present in the secondary system. The concomitance of these three criteria (Fig. 12 ) points out beyond doubt that a steam generator tube rupture has occurred and that an appropriated strategy must be launched to mitigate the consequences. Three strategies are investigated in the following sections. The affected SG is always the SG number 2.
Option A
The leading idea of option A is to lock the emergency condenser of the affected SG in a closed position, as soon as the SGTR is detected.
The primary and secondary pressures are displayed in Fig. 13 The closing of secondary isolation valves leads to a sudden pressurization in both SGs. When SG1 pressure reaches 75 bars, the emergency condenser n°1 (EC1) is connected, and the pressure starts to decrease. SG2 pressure continues to increase, because the emergency condenser has been locked by the SGTR signal. When the pressure reaches 83 bars, the safety valves are ICoNETS Conference Proceedings passively opened. During 1,000 seconds, there are several discharges of secondary steam through the safety valves. Meantime, the primary pressure strongly decreases, thanks the combined action of the two PPHXs, the EC1 and the safety valves of SG2. At t=1800s (23 minutes after the tube rupture), the balance between primary pressure and SG2 pressure is achieved: the leaks stops. 
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As shown in Fig. 15 , the evolution of the pressures with the option B strategy is quite similar to option A (Fig. 13) . The difference lies in the management of emergency condenser n°2. It is opened then closed three times before the balance of pressures is established. This balance comes a little bit later than in option A (27 minutes after the tube rupture). The objective of not requesting the safety valves is reached: there is no radioactive contamination outside the affected steam generator. Yet, a new issue is raised by option B strategy. The IAEA definition of passive systems presented in [5] and detailed in [14] specifies that "valves used to initiate safety systems operation must be single-action relying on stored energy". The valves used to connect the emergency condenser to a steam generator rely on stored energy (on board batteries). But they are not single-action in option B strategy. They are opened and closed several times. The safety system forms by the emergency condenser and its valve cannot be called passive. A new challenge is to be addressed in the next option: mitigate the SGTR only with single-action valves. This low primary pressure value has been chosen lower than the opening set-point of the SG safety valves (83 bars). Thus, it is highly unlikely that the safety valves will be required if valve "B" is closed. Valve "B" is a pneumatic valve, just like valves A. But it is not managed by the usual compressed air system: valve B is managed by a dedicated air tank (see Fig. 19 ).
This measure is important to prevent the closing of both emergency condensers in case of compressed air system failure. 
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In the option C strategy as in Fig. 18 , the affected SG is depressurised during the first 
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Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was first to present an innovative nuclear concept. FLEXBLUE ® is a subsea based small modular reactor with inherent advantages in terms of siting, economics, impact and safety. In particular, the immersion of the plant is a great opportunity to protect the reactor from many hazards (storm, tsunami, earthquake, plane crash, extreme air temperature) and to provide the safety systems with an infinite heat sink. This later characteristic allows the implementation of very ambitious safety objectives. FLEXBLUE® safety concept relies on a full passivity. Every single accidental transients -including core melting -can be handled with passive systems only, without external electrical input, without operator action, and without any radioactive release to the environment. These objectives are highly relevant in the post-Fukushima context. The second goal of the paper was to work out a new strategy in case of a steam generator tube rupture. Initial strategy was safe but had an important impact on the availability of the plant. It comes out of this study that a new strategy is possible: the option C strategy presented in the previous section.
With a new valve on the emergency condensers inlet lines and an appropriated automatic command, it is possible to manage a SGTR with passive devices, without radioactive releases and with a very limited impact on the plant. Neither the containment nor the safety tank is contaminated. The leak of activated primary water is mostly confined to the affected steam generator and its emergency condenser. The safe state reached at the end of the transient is not limited in time because the heat sink is infinite.
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